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Key Observations 
1. Central counterparties (CCPs) provide derivative markets with benefits of multilateral netting and 
better collateralization, assurances of trade finality and settlement, and help bolster the market 
integrity.  
2. Strengthening CCPs is a necessary but hardly sufficient condition to ensure financial system stability. 
Macroprudential policy should supplement the work of CCPs with attentive monitoring and rapid 
resolution procedures:  
 Market liquidity conditions must be monitored vigilantly to ensure effective price discovery 
and market continuity. Regulators and supervisors must stand ready to support illiquid 
financial intermediaries if CCPs and markets threaten to seize.  
 A fast and certain recovery and resolution procedure of a failed CCP is essential. It would 
facilitate the CCP’s recapitalization and its ability to resume its function within the financial 
system. 
 
Introduction 
Central counterparties (CCPs) play a pivotal role in the post-crisis reforms of derivative market trading, 
especially for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. By stepping into the middle of trades, a CCP becomes “the 
buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer,” providing several benefits to market participants and 
promoting financial stability via multilateral netting and centralized default management.2 
 
Since the reform, CCPs have become an indispensable part of the infrastructure for derivative trading. 
Around 75 percent of swaps are now cleared through clearinghouses, compared with just 15 percent before 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis.3 Such an increase in the concentration of trading exposure led regulators and 
market participants to worry about the resilience of CCPs to systemic shocks. The first regulatory reaction 
was to designate the largest CCPs as systemically important financial market utilities (SIFMUs), and to 
develop stress tests to evaluate their robustness and identify vulnerabilities. Furthermore, a default 
                                                          
1 Claude Lopez, PhD, leads the International Finance and Macroeconomics team at the Milken Institute. Elham Saeidinezhad, PhD, is a research 
economist on this team. The authors would like to thank William Lee, Jonathon Adams-Kane, Jakob Wilhelmus and the participants of MI 
Workshop on “Macroprudential Policy and Financial Stability: Going Beyond Institutions” in Washington DC on June 2017, for their useful 
comments. Reviewed and approved to distribute by William Lee, Chief Economist at the Milken Institute. 
The views expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Milken Institute and its affiliates and employees. 
2 See Heckinger et al. (2013) for more details on CCPs.  
3 See Domanski, Gambacorta and Picillo (2015). 
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waterfall—a cascade of risk-mutualization backstops— is being designed to minimize the risk and the impact 
of a CCP member’s failure. 
 
Despite their critical role in ensuring trades, regulators may become over-reliant on CCPs to safeguard the 
financial system. This note highlights some commonly held misconceptions and overly-complacent 
conclusions about CCPs’ ability to stabilize financial markets, especially in the presence of systemic shocks. 
The current framework has been successful in reducing bilateral counterparty risk and securing CCPs’ ability 
to clear securities trading. Yet, still missing is a full assessment of the consequences of CCP operations on 
other segments of the financial ecosystem, apart from their impact on derivatives trading.  
 
Strengthening CCPs is a necessary but hardly sufficient condition to ensure financial system stability. In a 
post-crisis environment that is still reformulating and issuing new regulations, macroprudential regulators 
should be mindful of policies aimed at improving CCP functioning, inducing unintended consequences. 
Policymakers should also evaluate the potential for CCP margin requirements to be pro-cyclical, especially 
as CCP members become more interconnected among themselves and with other parts of the financial 
system. Policies that impose added responsibilities to CCPs may tax their ability to raise additional capital 
or liquidity during stressed market conditions. It is vital that in implementing new policies, assessments 
include how changes in CCP and market behavior affect third parties. Indeed, the new policies may induce 
undesirable and destabilizing system-wide behaviors.  
 
Proactive measures by supervisors and regulators are needed to supplement the enhanced role of CCPs and 
related changes to other parts of the financial infrastructure. Despite the potential for CCPs to ensure that 
derivative markets function smoothly, vigilant oversight by the public sector over systemically important 
functions of CCPs may still be needed to ensure the continuity of the trading system. Regulators and 
supervisors need to monitor market liquidity conditions, ensure effective price discovery, and stand ready 
to support illiquid financial intermediaries if CCPs and markets threaten to seize.  
 
The remainder of the note briefly summarizes the role of CCPs and their benefits before identifying some 
key issues that will shape macroprudential policymaking going forward.  
 
Central Counterparties’ Benefits in Dealing with Risk 
By strengthening the integrity of the clearing process when market participants engage in trading activities, 
CCPs help ensure that each trade will be cleared and settled. With CCPs, we would expect benefits that 
include the following: 
 
 Reducing counterparty risk in all cleared contracts—the CCP serves as a substitute 
counterparty and becomes the sole principal for each counterparty. As a result, the CCP takes 
market participants’ trading exposures onto its own balance sheet, relieving the counterparties of 
multilateral risk exposures.  
 Multilateral netting—CCP members are required to post both initial margin (IM) and variation 
margin (VM).4 As the sole principal, the CCP can offset these payment obligations across multiple 
                                                          
4 Margins are in the form of cash or other acceptable collateral such as treasuries or agency securities. The amount of initial margin required is 
based mainly on the clearing member’s portfolio risk components and remains constant for a given portfolio allocation. Variation margin is 
marked-to-market to reflect revaluation of positions and is calculated on a daily basis. 
 
 
3 
clearing members, only requesting their net amount. These netted obligations are generally much 
smaller, and acceptable collateral for margin requirements usually consists of high quality and 
liquid assets. Consequently, this multilateral netting process releases assets for participants to use 
elsewhere.  
 Centralized risk management—by centralizing the margining process and collecting enough 
collateral, the CCP incorporates a sophisticated risk management system that contains the 
exposures arising from trading positions.  
 Transparency and better price information—the CCP has a well-informed price discovery 
mechanism based on a large number of derivatives trades. It also enhances system-wide price 
transparency by aggregating standardized data and making it available to other parts of the 
market.  
 
FIGURE 1. Centralized Clearing Substitutes the Clearinghouse as One of the Parties in Each Trade 
 
Source: Milken Institute (2014). 
 
With their enhanced importance in the financial system, CCPs, and, more specifically their resilience became 
a major concern for market participants and for regulators. Accordingly, regulators have required the largest 
CCPs to follow a three-step assessment process. First, a systemically important CCP is identified and 
designated as a systemically important market utility (SIFMU). Second, the CCP is required to implement 
stress testing and the results are evaluated by the regulator. And third, the CCP must design a plan for 
recovery and orderly resolution. The stress tests are intended to detect vulnerabilities and improve the 
CCP’s risk management, including required levels of capital and margin. The recovery and resolution 
planning helps to ensure the continuity of the trading system through a well-defined waterfall in the case 
of a default of a CCP member.5 
 
This waterfall, as described in Table 1, is a multi-layer line of defense to contain losses if a counterparty 
defaults. It starts with the defaulter’s prefunded resources, such as margins and default fund contributions. 
If these are not enough to cover the losses, the CCP can draw from its own capital and other members’ 
contributions to the default fund. Once these are exhausted, the CCP may call pre-agreed unfunded 
                                                          
5 BIS and IOSCO (2016) provide guidance on how to implement the principles for financial market infrastructures for CCPs.  
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resources from non-defaulting members.6 Finally, if these prove insufficient, the CCP would have access to 
other loss absorption tools, such as variation margin gain haircuts, that are applied not only to its members, 
but also to their clients. 
The backstopping afforded by multiple layers of loss-absorption embedded in the waterfall is designed to 
make the CCP and its trading system more resilient in the event of a member’s default. However, it is 
important to note that enhancing the resilience of CCPs is a necessary but far from sufficient condition to 
ensure financial system stability, especially in time of systemic stress. The following section broadens our 
analysis to include system-wide considerations. 
 
TABLE 1. CCP’s Waterfall 
Resources Affected Parties Layers of Protection 
 
 
 
Prefunded 
Defaulting member 
 
1—Initial margins,  
2— Guarantee fund 
 
CCP 
 
3— CCP's Capital  
 
Non-Defaulting 
members 
 
4— Guaranty fund 
 
Pre-agreed  
Unfunded 
 
Non-Defaulting 
Members 
 
5— Assessments 
 
 
Other 
Non-Defaulting 
Members 
Investors/Dealers 
6— Variation Margin 
Haircutting/Initial 
Margin Haircutting 
 
Source: Based on OFR (2017). 
 
CCPs Have Spillover Effects that May Detract from Financial Stability 
Macroprudential policy aims to mitigate risk to the financial system as a whole. Yet, most of the 
macroprudential assessment of new CCP regulations evaluate the individual CCP’s resilience in isolation, 
without considering potential spillovers this new rule may have on the rest of the financial system. In other 
words, market participants’ trading behavior and changes in their risk profile associated with mandatory 
central clearing for standardized OTC derivatives tend to be overlooked. That is because they may affect 
parts of the financial system outside derivative trading, and often considered to be outside the purview of 
CCP regulators and supervisors.  
 
However, ignoring such spillovers may led to overly optimistic expectation when it comes to CCPs’ ability to 
alleviate pressure on the financial system, especially in time of financial distress. We believe supervisors and 
regulators should implement procedures to supplement the work of CCPs, especially around three specific 
dimensions: pro-cyclicality of margin requirements; additional interconnections induced by CCPs among 
members and counterparties; and third-party exposures. 
                                                          
6 Other ex-ante funding arrangements with insurance companies exist. Insurance services for clearinghouses can be underwritten through 
schemes such as GCSA, a US-based consortium of 20 insurance companies. 
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Pro-Cyclicality of Mark-to-Market Margin Requirements Reduce Market Liquidity 
More collateral to adequately pre-fund CCPs may reduce leverage in derivatives markets, but such required 
additions may worsen liquidity conditions elsewhere. Margin requirements may have destabilizing feedback 
effects in times of market distress: under these conditions, meeting margin requirements implies raising 
more collateral at a time when market conditions are already illiquid. This induces a pro-cyclical excess 
demand for liquid funds at a time when liquidity is scarce.7 More frequent trades cleared through a small 
number of CCPs using similar margining methods may exacerbate such phenomena.8  
 
Interconnections Induced by CCPs May Strain Banks’ Ability to Meet Other 
Obligations 
Variation margin dynamics can further impair funding liquidity: margin calls are marked-to-market and vary 
daily. They call for more collateral when asset values are declining. The ability to meet margin requirements 
depends strongly on the extension of credit by clearing members, as they usually fund margin calls for their 
clients.9 In a period of extreme financial market stress, CCP members’ need to extend credit competes with 
their obligation to provide collateral in the event of counterparty defaults, as mandated by the clearinghouse 
itself.  
 
These competing interests and obligations may place extra pressure on clearing members at the worst time 
because defaults often occur during, or can even be induced by, widespread illiquid conditions. Moreover, 
CCP members are mostly banks that are also the main liquidity providers for the rest of the financial system. 
Consequently, pro-cyclical margining and their CCP member responsibilities have the potential to hinder 
banks’ ability to lend to other parts of the financial system, especially in times of already contracted liquidity 
supply.10  
 
Unanticipated Third-Parties’ Exposure to CCP Failure May Worsen Market 
Conditions 
The increasing systemic importance of CCPs raises questions about the balance between increasing capital 
to bolster CCPs’ resilience to large shocks, and ensuring that CCPs have adequate resolution plans. When 
the backstop provided by the CCP waterfall is no longer credible, current CCP procedures imply the 
possibility of broadening the base for the CCP to raise funds to third parties (e.g., end users who are not CCP 
members). This view regards end-user balance sheets to be a public good that can (and should) be used to 
bolster a failing CCP in times of financial market stress. This is because the CCP is thought to provide such 
firms services and assurances of trade finality when market conditions are normal.  
 
                                                          
7 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that margin requirements dictate lower margins when the market is liquid and volatility is low and 
higher margins during high volatility and illiquid market conditions.  
8 Park and Abruzzo (2016) show that a margin model based on value-at-risk methodologies may understate the risk in normal conditions and 
amplify them in time of stress. Most large CCPs use these models. OFR (2017) provides an analysis of clearing members’ concentration.  
9 Banks provide credit lines to their clients in order to meet their variable margin obligations on a daily basis during the lifetime of the contract. 
Variable margins are mostly cash payments. 
10 Pirrong (2014) provides several illustrations for this point. 
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Furthermore, under the Dodd-Frank legislation, the recovery and resolution procedure for SIFMUs relies on 
discretionary behavior of a regulatory body (e.g., the FDIC), which decides on the criteria and procedures 
for reorganizing a failed institution. Such procedures include the arbitrary reallocation of credits and losses 
of the failed institution among its creditors, guided by the desire to ensure overall financial stability and the 
viability of the new entity.  
 
However, such discretion under Dodd-Frank resolution procedures increases uncertainty, and may induce 
market behaviors among non-CCP members (end users) that worsen financial stability. Unlike clearing 
members, end investors do not have a contractual relationship with the CCP beyond the finality of the trade 
for which the CCP is a counterparty. Without assurances of finality under a resolution process, third parties 
may want to sell their derivative holdings as soon as possible if the CCP’s viability is questioned or if the 
waterfall is likely to be triggered.  
 
The risks described in this section highlight the difference between micro- and macro-prudential policy: the 
former controls the risks within intermediaries while the latter looks at the impact one financial institution 
imposes on other institutions and markets. A broader mandate for CCPs may appear to improve micro- and 
macro-prudential conditions, but they may not reduce systemic risk because of unintended consequences 
of policies aimed at ensuring a CCP’s survival. Such policies may be more destabilizing than swift and certain 
recovery and resolution procedures that restore market functioning quickly.  
 
Concluding Remarks: CCPs Have Limitations and Need Additional 
Macroprudential Policies to Assure Financial Stability 
In their function as a sole principal for derivatives trades, CCPs provide several benefits—multilateral 
netting, collateralization, and collective loss mitigation. They also enhance transparency (in derivative 
markets) and encourage standardized derivative contracts. 
 
While CCPs ensure related trades are settled and paid, it is less certain that the policies to improve their 
viability always strengthen overall financial stability. Indeed, many of the channels of risk transmission 
between CCPs and the financial system—direct and indirect—remain to be identified, following the changes 
induced by the new regulation requiring CCPs for derivative trading. 
 
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the impact on the overall financial stability of a stronger mandate for, or 
expanded use of CCPs. Studies focusing on financial stability usually attempt to assess macroprudential 
policy changes holistically, often with a succession of “what if” scenarios due to the complexity of the 
financial system.11 In contrast, most derivatives-centric analyses overlook the potential for spillovers from 
CCP operations and member obligations to affect other segments of the financial ecosystem. 
 
In this note, we highlighted three dimensions of CCP operations that have undeniable potential to challenge 
overly optimistic expectations, especially in times of generalized financial distress: pro-cyclicality of CCP 
margin requirements; additional interconnections induced by CCPs among members and counterparties; 
and third-party exposures. 
 
                                                          
11 See Financial Stability Report (2016). 
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While addressing all of these risks may not be feasible, pursuing the following regulatory initiatives will be 
essential in mitigating their impact: 
 
 Pro-cyclicality of margins—the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure 
require margin models to not be “overly” pro-cyclical. The CFTC Risk Management Subcommittee 
suggests mitigating this risk by easing the financial burdens, where possible, for members who 
provide those margins during bad times. 12,13  While still very much a work in progress, some 
reforms, such as these, are needed to address the “pro-cyclicality problem.” 
 Funding liquidity markets—in the event of a member’s default, CCPs face immediate liquidity 
risks. Although many CCPs have arranged liquidity facilities, there is an element of “wrong-way 
risk” if the defaulting member is part of the liquidity facility.14 Furthermore, the issue may not be 
inadequate margin collateral but the inability for the CCP to provide timely payment to surviving 
clearing members, especially in presence of systemic liquidity issues. 15 Consequently, when there 
is widespread financial distress, the central bank should step up to meet its obligation as the 
“lender of last resort” and provide liquidity to CCPs —either directly or indirectly via CPP members, 
i.e. banks. 
 Resolution process—a fast and certain recovery and resolution procedure of a failed CCP is 
essential. It would facilitate the CCP’s recapitalization and its ability to resume its function within 
the financial system. The Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2017, passed by the House, is a 
step in the right direction as it provides a set of clear and transparent rules to follow. 
 
Finally, clearing performs best when the financial products being cleared are traded in deep and liquid 
markets, and with standardized contracts. Expanding the current centralized framework that features 
CCPs to trading in complex and illiquid non-standardized OTC derivatives may lead CCPs to take on risks 
that they cannot safely manage, or that require CCP members to provide unaffordable levels of 
collateral or liquidity.16 This is another example where reducing risk (and possibly leverage) in one 
market (in this case, OTC derivatives) may not automatically improve overall system-wide financial 
stability.  
   
                                                          
12 In order to reduce the burden, they also recommend allowing the non-defaulting members to rely on the defaulting members’ assessment of 
their customers, known as “Know-Your-Customer” (KYC) practice, when servicing defaulting member’s portfolios. 
13 CCP Risk Management Subcommittee Final Recommendations (2016) suggest a “temporary relief from capital requirements for the non-
defaulting clearing member could help alleviate the risk of the trades and collateral moving at different times making portability more likely.” 
14 That is, the exposure to a counterparty is not independent from the credit quality of that counterparty but is negatively correlated, based on the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)’s definition.  
15 Cox and Steigerwald (2017) discuss this point. 
16 In February 2017, however, the CFTC delayed the implementation of its Dodd-Frank variation margin (VM) rules that require financial 
counterparties to collateralize mark-to-market exposure to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives that are not centrally cleared by a registered 
clearinghouse. 
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